Network complements and pricing
It has been argued in the past that network industries would exhibit strong economies of scale.
For this reason, it was preferred to have a single supplier in order not to induce wasteful duplication of resources. In order to avoid excessive monopoly charges, the "natural" monopolist was either owned directly by the State or heavily regulated. This view has been challenged in the last two decades. Technological changes have drastically reduced unit costs in most network segments, and arguably the relevance of economies of scale is exhausted rather rapidly for low levels of output. 1 Poor quality of services offered by incumbents and the asymmetries of information between the regulator and the regulated firm offered additional arguments to liberalise the entire sector, even in the presence of economies of scale.
In the current scenario, intervention aims at being less intrusive, letting the competitive process deliver the intended outcomes. The regulatory attention is now devoted to the design 1 Mobile communications, and more in general cell-based wireless communications exhibit more or less constant returns to scale. Mobile services are supplied using a grid of cells connected to the fixed network. As new areas are covered, or as traffic increases within a given area, the only option left to an operator is to invest in additional cells or to do "cell splitting". Also transmission (long-distance) is more or less subject to constant returns to scale globally, although locally it exhibits increasing returns (dark fibre is usually installed in excess).
• Increments are defined. The cost-volume relationships then show the cost saving if an increment is no longer provided
• The total of these costs is the LRIC of the service increment.
While the concept of LRIC relies on a respectable theoretical background, the practice of the computation of LRIC is much more problematic. Firstly, LRIC is at odds with traditional depreciation practices (typically straight-line). In the presence of technological progress, straight-line schedules would underestimate the true economic annual cost. This practice may be sponsored by regulators that, by choosing slow depreciation schedules, can obtain lower current prices, an appealing feature when they want to encourage entry. However, this does not have any economic justification and it is also sustainable only if the regulator could promise at the same time higher future prices, otherwise investments would never happen.
Secondly, the computation of LRIC is simple for a single activity which involves fixed costs (it simply corresponds to average total cost), but it is much more complicated when an activity is an input to the production of two or more output (think of exchange switches). The definition of increments turns out to be crucial and it is often dictated by objectives other than efficiency. Thirdly, LRIC computations still involve a lot of discretion, in particular in the definition of a sensible cost of capital. 2
Cost-based rules
Once the LRIC of a bottleneck is known, the next question to ask is what the access price should be. Imagine the following stylised situation. In order to provide one unit of final good, downstream firms need one unit of the upstream input that is produced by the bottleneck owner at a unit LRIC c 0 in change of a unit access charge denoted by a.
If all firms in the downstream sector are similar (in terms of technology and products), downstream firms undercut each other until price competition drives to zero all extra profits.
The price charged to final users ends up equal to the marginal cost of each firm, which amounts to the sum of the access charge and any other cost incurred in order to transform the intermediate good. If we denote the latter by c, the final price would be p = a + c.
Without any other source of distortion, the best that could be done is to follow a marginal rule: the price to the final user (the consumer willingness-to-pay) should be set equal to the total marginal cost of production. The access price should thus be set equal to the marginal cost of production (a = c 0 ) and in the end the consumer price would be p = c 0 + c.
A marginal rule of this type is relatively easy to understand and to implement. This explains -at least in part -why forward-looking LRICs have been recommended for a liberalised telecommunication market by the European Commission (98/195/EC). But when is it appropriate? The answer is: only when there are no other distortions in the industry. On the other hand, distortions in the incumbent's retail prices may exist for various reasons, for instance because the bottleneck involves also some unapportioned fixed costs, hence a marginal rule would not allow to recover them. Another type of distortion arises when the incumbent's prices do not reflect its cost structure, because the incumbent is constrained by some social obligations to charge identical prices in different geographic region. In these circumstances, a marginal rule is not the correct benchmark unless additional instruments are used simultaneously to relieve the access charge from additional tasks (more on this in the section on USO). Access charges purely based on LRIC are an appropriate benchmark when retail-level distortions are eliminated (for instance by tariff rebalancing) or dealt with using other instruments. On the other hand, the common practice to apply uniform mark ups to the LRIC estimates to recover unapportioned costs does not reflect much economic analysis (see also section 2.1 of Cave and Prosperetti in this issue).
Efficient component pricing rule (Retail minus)
The access pricing problem may arise in a context in which the regulation of access is separated from users' prices. Supposing that the final product prices are already fixed, then access price has no effect on allocative efficiency. The regulator may still be concerned with productive efficiency, that is to say with efficient entry and cost minimisation. As can be inferred from the analysis above, the downside of adopting LRIC access charges in such an unsuitable circumstance is that inefficient entry would be encouraged. Another option is then to move away from a "cost plus" approach based on estimated network costs to one in which access charges are derived from retail prices. The pricing policy that concentrates only on productive efficiency is the popular and controversial ECPR (Efficient Component Pricing Rule) also known as the Baumol-Willig rule, the imputation rule, the margin rule, or the parity-pricing formula. 3 The rule states that when final products are homogeneous and the market is contestable, the access charge should be equal to the difference between the final price and the incumbent's marginal cost on the competitive segment (c 1 ):
(1) a = p -c 1 = c 0 + (p -c 0 -c 1)
ECPR can be read in many equivalent ways:
• As a margin rule, it says that the margin of the incumbent in the final market (p -a) should be equal to its marginal cost in the downstream activity (c 1 ).
review. Top-down approaches are based on existing cost structures reported in the accounts. They are useful since they can reflect complex networks, however they are also more opaque and may hide inefficiencies.
• As a parity principle, the bottleneck owner imputes itself for the bottleneck input the same price at which entrants buy the input, hence any attempt to practice a price squeeze would be detected by simple accounting separation.
• Productive efficiency is ensured. A potential entrant enters only if it is viable, which occurs only if firms are more efficient than the incumbent in the downstream activity.
• Entry does not alter the bottleneck cost recovery (revenue neutrality).
• Alternatively, the rule says that the access charge should be equal to the direct cost of providing cost (c 0 ) + the opportunity cost of providing access (p -c 0 -c 1 ) since this is the reduction in the incumbent's profit caused by the provision of access. In words:
The simplicity of the formula explains in part its popularity. Revenue neutrality for the incumbent, on the other hand, is also the criticism made by opponents: if the incumbent is earning supernormal profits, they will continue to be earned also in presence of potential entrants. In this respect, the rule guarantees monopoly rents! However, the observation is not completely appropriate because ECPR assumes that final prices are optimally set.
The simplicity of ECPR is only apparent, since it derives from strong assumptions. In particular, entrants may offer new product varieties, so that consumer choice increases.
Entrants may also be able to supply the bottleneck themselves, though using less efficient technologies. As shown by Armstrong (2001a) , eq. (1) would have to be modified into the following more complex formula when demand-side and supply-side substitution possibilities are taken into account:
In eq. (3) the opportunity cost to the incumbent is multiplied by a factor σ called "displacement ratio". The displacement ratio determines how much sales the incumbent firm loses as a result of supplying access to its rivals. The displacement ratio is generally less than 1, according to the degree of product differentiation, bypass opportunities and technological substitution. The opportunity cost of supplying access to rivals is typically reduced because there is not a one-for-one displacement of the incumbent's sales.
ECPR in its more complex formulation has never been put in practice. When advocated, it is generally in its simplest form given by eq. (1). In the UK, ECPR was discarded by the regulator in the mid-90's when a change was proposed in the computation of BT interconnection charges (Valletti, 1999) . Perhaps to avoid the embarrassment of reintroducing the same concept after some time, the regulator has recently advocated its use under a different name -"Retail minus" -when it discussed the roaming charges that entrants would have to pay in the market for 3G mobile services for roaming on incumbents' networks in case negotiations failed. It is a bit ironic that ECPR did not find applications in fixed telephony at the time when incumbent's prices were regulated -in line with one of the assumptions of the proponents -while it is now proposed in mobile telephony where final prices are unregulated.
Ramsey charges and global caps
A final option is to recover fixed costs and common costs in direct proportion to servicespecific incremental costs. This is the benchmark situation that emerges with a "benevolent" regulator quite familiar with the cost structure of service providers as well as their effort levels to minimise costs. This regulator fixes all the prices in order to maximise an unweighted sum of consumer well-being and total industry profits, subject to a break-even constraint for the incumbent. The optimal theoretical access charge can be rewritten as:
in other words, it is very close to the generalised version of ECPR as given by eq. (3), plus an additional term that is related to the inverse of the elasticity of final users. Such extra term can be understood by noting that, in order to reduce distortions, customers of services that are not price sensitive should contribute more to the recovery of fixed costs. For example, if demand for calls from fixed to mobile users is less elastic than for long distance calls, then the access service of call origination should have a higher mark-up when requested by a mobile operator to terminate mobile calls, than when sold to an operator to provide long-distance calls.
Downstream firms are like middlemen between the bottleneck monopolist and the final users.
The access charge to the firm selling to users with rigid demand should therefore be higher than the access charge paid by another firm selling to consumers that are more price-sensitive.
The formula is saying that optimal charges derive both from demand and supply analysis.
It is important to keep in mind that access is priced above marginal cost not because the incumbent exerts monopoly power but because deficits are socially costly and the charge performs as a tax used to raise money that repays the deficit. The charge is particularly high when it does not distort too much the allocation in the final market (the elasticity of the entrant's customers is low) or when the budget balance is particularly severe (equivalently, the social cost of public funds is high). By increasing a beyond its marginal cost of production, some retail prices can be reduced, which is in the interest of final users.
Ramsey charges imply that services that use the same bottleneck may end up paying different mark ups if their elasticity is different. However in practice many regulators would not allow this for the fear that the incumbent could engage in anti-competitive practices. For instance it is very likely that the EC would interpret Ramsey access charges as unfair and discriminatory. Such a fear is not always reasonable. As long as the regulator can ensure that market power is not abused, economic theory calls for different charges whenever demand elasticities are different, allowing for price reductions in more price responsive segments
Even more fundamentally, in order to implement Ramsey prices, a great deal of information is required. The regulator should know the cost of the regulated firm and also the different elasticities of demand. This kind of information is more likely to be in the regulated firm's hands rather than the regulator's. An immediate implication is that it would be better to delegate pricing decision to the firm, for instance using a global price cap, as proposed by Laffont and Tirole (2000) , on the entire incumbent's range of products, treating the bottleneck input as a final good and including it in the computation of the price cap. The good properties of price cap mechanisms are well known and put in practice for the control of final prices.
However, most regulators have resisted so far the introduction of global caps, preferring to control separate baskets for final and wholesale prices (this is for instance the way Oftel regulates in the UK).
To conclude the discussion contained in section 2.1-2.4, it is important to understand that different goals and policy objectives lead to alternative ways of calculating optimal charges.
There is also one important practical corollary: the access charge is often performing too many tasks. While it is true that theory is useful to understand the mediating function of access prices, we stress that one first fundamental step should precede any access distortion:
whenever possible, the use of access pricing as an instrument for the promotion of too many goals should be resisted and other instruments should be used. For instance, if the regulator believes there are barriers to entry, the tax/subsidy issue of the entry barrier should be addressed directly and be made explicit, rather than burying it into the access pricing problem.
The latter could indeed be the only option available, but only after having realised that other options are not feasible. In other words, by understanding the links between different problems, new instruments become available that allow fine-tuning of the regulatory process.
Entry and bundling
Arguably the biggest concern calling for regulation of access charges in network industries is that an integrated incumbent may use its monopoly position in some segments to sustain or extend market power in other segments that are potentially subject to competition. This is a classic problem of "leverage" that has attracted considerable attention in the literature on bundling. The analogy is close since an incumbent may make entry in a market unprofitable in different ways, e.g tying by product design, or "virtual" tying through pricing. 4 In its simplest form the leverage theory has been largely discredited by the Chicago Entry can also be deterred by discouraging rivals from investing in innovative activities.
Bundling (or -equivalently -denial of access to an essential facility) can then be a formidable tool in the hands of the incumbent in risky and dynamic industries. To see this, imagine firm M is the incumbent for two perfectly complementary products, A and B. There are n identical consumers demanding one unit of a final product for prices that do not exceed their reservation value V. If it is not challenged by any rival, M can earn monopoly profits π M = n(V -2c) in the overall market, where c is the unit cost of production for each component. There are 2 potential entrants, E A and E B , one in each segment. Suppose entrants have to make an up-front investment and, in case the investment succeeds, they become more efficient than the incumbent in their segment. Let denote by S the surplus resulting from each innovation (i.e., the unit cost saving ∆ multiplied by the quantity produced S = n∆).
5 Another reason to bundle would emerge even in uncontested monopolies as a form of price discrimination when there is a negative correlation between the reservation prices of goods A and B. Negative correlation is probably not too relevant in network industries with high product complementarity. 6 The commitment problem disappears in Nalebuff (2000) , where an incumbent sells complementary products. In this situation, the incumbent can achieve a better price coordination by bundling several components compared to individual component rivals (a well known result in IO that goes back to Cournot). This can be a stable equilibrium, in the sense that the incumbent prefers bundling to selling each component individually and, If both entrants are successful, the incumbent does not sell anything. Also in this case there is a multiplicity of equilibria that distribute differently the total surplus 2S. As before, we concentrate on the symmetric case. This means that each component is sold at the incumbent's cost c and each entrant obtains the full reward S for its innovation.
The outcome of entrants' investments is uncertain. The more an entrant invests, the higher the probability that the investment is successful. In particular, in order to get a probability p of a successful innovation, suppose a firm has to invest an amount p 2 /2. We impose the restriction 0 < S < 1 in order for the probability not to exceed 1, as will become apparent below.
We are now in a position to analyse a simple 3-stage game where the incumbent decides first whether to bundle the two components or not, followed by entrants' investment decisions and, finally, by price competition. Solving backwards, the solution to the last stage has already been described above. In the second stage, we have to analyse two possible cases. In the first case, there is no tying. This means that an entrant -if successful -can either sell its product with the incumbent if the other rival has not been successful, or with the rival if it has succeeded as well. The investment choice for firm E A comes from the following problem:
The solution at a symmetric equilibrium (p A = p B ) is easily obtained where each entrant selects the following probability of success (the superscript n stand for the no-tying case): p n = S/(2 -S), which is a number comprised between 0 and 1 given the restriction on S.
On the other hand, in case the incumbent decides to tie its components, the entrant can sell if and only if both entrants are successful, hence it maximises the following expression:
at the same time, rivals prefers not form a rival bundle to avoid ruinous competition of bundle against bundle. This result is relevant for markets that produce "systems": Microsoft Office is the case in point.
The first-order condition at a symmetric equilibrium is p A (S -1) < 0, implying that, with tying (superscript t), no entrant has any incentive to invest:
It is immediate to see what are the effects of tying: it gives less options to the entrants, decreasing their incentives to innovate and to enter in the first place. Our example is extreme, but it keeps the flavour of the argument developed under more general conditions by Choi and Stefanadis (2001) . The trade-off that the incumbent faces is also easy to recognise. On the one hand, if it ties it lowers the probability of joint entry that would completely displace the incumbent. On the other hand, without tying there is a probability that part of the surplus created by the entrant can be appropriated by the incumbent. In analytical terms, the incumbent's profit under tying and no tying are respectively:
By comparing the previous expressions, it turns out that tying would be profitable only
, that is when there is a big interest to protect monopoly profits. Notice that the previous inequality is particularly likely to hold when S is high. On the one hand, the incumbent could share part of the gains, however the rivals' incentives to invest would be very high, making it likely a joint success that would leave the incumbent with zero profits.
Bundling becomes profitable when there is a high risk of being supplanted by low-cost entrants in both components.
In this example bundling is clearly inefficient. All consumer surplus is extracted and no cost-reducing investment occurs (notice that a social planner would invest even more than the no tying case since it would coordinate better than the two potential entrants). We should warn that this conclusion cannot be generalised. A full welfare analysis would have to take into account also the incumbent's incentive to invest. 7
Two-way access pricing: the call termination problem
Most communications involve two-way networks: calls initiated by a subscriber of a certain network may be terminated on a different network and, conversely, a certain network will terminate calls originated on other networks. There are revenues associated with terminating calls, and this should have an impact on outgoing charges that operators set to attract customers in the first place. Termination charges also feed directly into call charges when calls are destined to a rival network, making the problem even more challenging. In this section we neglect this additional effect -addressed in section 2.8 -and consider a simpler situation where termination revenues arise from a separate market. A relevant example is the so called fixed-to-mobile termination problem.
It is a common practice in mobile telephony that the party that makes and pays for the call is not the same as the party that chooses which operator will terminate the call. This system, known as CPP (calling party pays) is adopted almost in every country in mobile telephony, with the notable exceptions of Canada and the US where there is a RPP system (receiving party pays). Under CPP, there is a striking discrepancy between the interconnection rates for fixed-to-mobile services compared to the interconnection rates paid for mobile-tofixed services. 8
Once a person has decided to join a particular mobile operator, that operator has a monopoly position over termination services to its subscribers. The decision to subscribe to a network has an influence on the price charged to all other customers that may want to call that person. Hence termination services involve an externality problem that is a potential source of distortions. 9 It should be noted that the termination problem is not peculiar to mobile entrants since this allows M to practice a better squeeze (M can offer consumers as much surplus as possible in the complementary product in order to extract high surplus from primary market). M does not engage in the squeeze to earn more money on that product, rather it lets the competitor sell but extracts profits in the complementary market. Integration strengthens the squeeze since M has an additional instrument to force low prices, either via pricing or via producing a better product; however the downside is that ex ante incentives to invest are reduced. 8 According to OECD (2000) the ratio of average interconnection rate for fixed-to-mobile was 11:1 compared to mobile-to fixed in OECD countries adopting CPP. While there are difference in costs in the two services, they are hardly enough to justify such a difference. To confirm this, the same ratio was 1:1 in the US. 9 A second source of distortions is related to consumer ignorance. In its inquiry into mobile termination rates, the UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission found that fixed-line users had little knowledge of the mobile network they were calling and of the call price (MMC, 1998) . If fixed-line users base their calling decisions only on an estimated price based on mobile market shares, then the link between a specific termination charge set by a network and the number of calls terminated on that network is broken. If a mobile network raises its termination charge, it gets the full benefit and shares with other mobile networks the reduction in the number of calls received. As a consequence, networks will have an incentive to set very high termination rates. This problem is telephony but is common to all network operators. In the context of mobile telephony, the subscriber base of fixed users is large, hence the number of calls potentially terminated on mobile networks represents an important source of revenues for mobile operators.
In a stylised situation where the mobile sector is perfectly competitive and mobile operators charge two-part tariffs to customers with identical preferences (for instance a monthly fee and a charge per minute for every call made), then operators would compete to attract customers by setting each call charge equal to its marginal cost and then set the fixed component to divide the surplus created between the operator and its customers. If, as assumed, the mobile industry is perfectly competitive, operators would earn zero extra-profits.
Any increase in termination profits (for instance because the termination charge is set above its cost) would simply be passed to mobile subscribers via lower fixed charges. Fixed charges may even become negative, as long as considerable extra-profits arise from termination: this result may explain handset subsidies, a common feature in many mobile markets. 10 It is clear that, even with perfect competition for mobile users, there is little competition for providing access to mobile subscribers. This remark suggests that if mobile operators are free to determine termination rates, they will set charges that extract all possible surplus from fixed users. In principle then some regulatory intervention can be beneficial.
Welfare considerations on termination rates are complicated, since an increase in termination charges both increases fixed-to-mobile calls and decreases fixed fees to mobile users. As discussed by Armstrong (2001a) , marginal cost pricing (implying no subsidies for mobile connections) is the correct benchmark when a certain number of stringent assumptions are satisfied. In particular, the demand of mobile subscribers should be rigid with respect to subscription decisions, there should be no monopoly power exercised by the fixed network and there should be no network or call externality. If mark-ups over termination charges are added by fixed operators, they should be counteracted by setting termination charges below cost. On the other hand, above-cost charges would be beneficial in the presence of network externalities, since higher termination revenues could be used to subsidise entry, thereby raising the equilibrium number of subscribers that benefits everybody, because both fixed-line potentially exacerbated by the adoption of mobile number portability since there could be no correspondence between a certain number and the current network choice of a subscriber. Carrier identification should then be promoted in order to make termination services more competitive. 10 Handset subsidies and, more in general, subscription discounts, are also related to the presence of switching costs (Klemperer, 1995) . With consumer switching costs, a firm is typically willing to serve to a larger set of customers in the first periods than in traditional models because this enlarges its "captive segment" of the market and mobile customers are able to call and be called by additional subscribers. As a result, unregulated above-cost termination charges may be "good" in the initial phases of mobile development since they increase cellular penetration rates.
The potential market failure associated with termination services may be considerably diluted if people care about receiving calls. In our discussion, we have implicitly assumed that users either do not receive calls, or do not place any value on incoming calls. On the other hand, it is more plausible that mobile phones are purchased with a desire to receive calls as well as to make them. If a mobile user places similar weights to calls made and received, then any attempt of a mobile operator to set high termination charges would induce subscribers to change network, since they would otherwise receive too few calls. Notice that this result is true even if the caller and the receiver do not belong to the same "closed group". The argument that people may care about receiving calls is particularly compelling in the mobile sector since a mobile phone gives a customer the ability to be reached by other people at any time in any place. Unfortunately there is not enough econometric evidence on calling patterns in mobile telecommunications to say a final word on the relevance of the termination problem and this is an area where further research is needed.
To conclude, it has to be recognised that -under CPP -there is a potential market failure, independently from the share an operator might have. There are many ways to cure it.
Termination charges based on LRIC is an option that, as we argued before, is legitimate under some circumstances. However this kind of intervention would be rather heavy handed. An alternative would be to try to put a downward pressure on termination charges, using a price cap over the entire bundle of services offered by a mobile company. This is also quite an interventionist approach that many operators would want to avoid. In a related vein, the Australian regulator ACCC has recently decided that any discount that mobile operators offer to their customers would have to be passed also on termination. The obvious downside to this is that, in the anticipation of the additional effect, operators would be more reluctant to fight against each other to attract mobile customers.
Since the fixed-to-mobile termination problem has not arisen in North America under RPP, perhaps this is an alternative pricing arrangement that regulators might want to consider.
in the following periods. In the specific context of mobile communications, the presence of switching costs is also important to understand the vertical links between operators and service providers (Valletti, 2000) .
However, growth rates have been slower in North America compared to Europe. 11 Given the current level of penetration, this makes RPP arguably an interesting option for 2G mobile telephony since there is no further need to subsidise the subscriber base. However, also in this case there is a downside that may produce unintended effects. Recall that the intervention is lead by the desire to pass some more benefits on to fixed subscribers. Under a RPP, it may happen that -despite the decrease in the price of fixed-to-mobile calls would increase attempted calls -the actual number of completed calls is diminished since the receivers would keep their handset switched off more often than under CPP. Hence fixed users may be worse off under RPP.
To strike the right balance among these alternative options is a delicate and challenging regulatory task. By going into the very nature of the problem in question one may find better solutions that do not bring potential costs from regulatory failure. For instance, the call termination problem exists because operators do not compete directly over this type of services. The best solution would not be to intervene by setting the charges, but rather take steps to eliminate the bottleneck. For instance, giving the customers the opportunity to choose two operators -one for origination and one for termination of calls -would create direct competition in both markets, without having to worry too much about the linkages we discussed above. 12 Clearly, there would be some costs associated to this unbundling proposal, for instance the handset would have to contain two SIM cards, however this is the kind of creative solution we hope that regulators will be looking for in the future, bringing benefits without being intrusive.
Two-way access pricing and competition: open issues
The call termination problem described in the previous section is rather extreme in the sense that it is relevant when the market of callers is completely separate from the market of receivers (e.g., mobile users and fixed subscribers in the previous section A first concern arises when access prices can be used as an instrument of tacit collusion (Armstrong, 1998; Laffont et al., 1998) . Collusive (i.e., monopoly) prices can be sustained using high access charges because of a raise-each-other's cost effect. To see this, imagine what happens if operators charge monopoly prices to customers. If customers call each other with the same probability, the traffic is balanced and an operator pays the rival for termination services the same amount it receives from the rival for similar services, independently from the value taken by the access charge. This can be an equilibrium only if no one has a unilateral incentive to deviate. If one firm deviates from the monopoly charges by undercutting the rival, it induces its subscribers to call more. Since part of the calls made are destined to the rival's network, the effect of a price cut is to send out more calls than it receives on-net from the rival. The resulting net outflow of calls has an associated access deficit that is particularly burdensome if the unit access charge is high. This will discourage underpricing in the first place. To get this result some conditions are needed, for instance products need to be not too homogeneous, otherwise the incentive to undercut would have the additional benefit to get market share.
Perhaps more crucially, another condition that is needed to generate this non-cooperative collusive result is that tariffs are linear. Once firms are allowed to offer non-linear prices the result collapses. For instance, with two-part pricing, it is still true that a high access charge feeds into high retail charges. However, all the profits generated are used to lower the fixed component (an example is call termination described in the previous section). Pricing itself may become efficient, since operators would tend to charge call prices equal to their perceived marginal costs: this result typically occurs when operators have more instruments to build will also be inclined to choose separately the cheapest package offered by competing operators to terminate calls since he will anticipate that more people will be willing to call him. market shares without having to inflate their outflow charges. As we have just described, these models also tend to generate profit neutrality with respect to access charges. This feature is an artefact of the symmetry considered by most models, and it typically disappears when firms differ in their cost structures, or when there is partial market participation or biased calling patterns among consumers (Dessein, 2000) .
More sophisticated pricing policies are interesting since they better reflect the reality of pricing practices among operators. For example, mobile operators may price discriminate between calls destined on-net and off-net. In this case profits would depend on access charges.
In particular, low access charges become profitable overall since customers become a liability and firms are less willing to fight aggressively for market share. While price discrimination may well be dictated by efficiency reasons reflecting customer heterogeneity, their downside is that they can also be used anti-competitively. an interconnecting carrier to terminate a call. When both parties -the sender and the receiver -benefit from a call, it is efficient that they both share the costs. This does not happen when operators can exercise monopoly over termination fees, which is a typical feature of CPP systems. DeGraba argues that competition works more effectively when operators recover their costs from end users who can choose among competing carriers. A bill and keep system would then reduce the termination monopoly access problem. Such a system may also resolve a second source of regulatory inefficiency, since termination charges are typically structured as per-minute charges, while most network costs are based on required capacity, allowing carriers to achieve efficient end-user rate structures. Finally, by eliminating inter-carrier termination charges, artificial cost differences between on-net and off-net calls would be eliminated. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is known to be examining bill and keep as a solution to termination charges in the US, with particular reference to ISP reciprocal compensations.
Access prices and investments
One of the most important issues in the economics of regulation is how to encourage firms to invest in infrastructure. Intuitively, there is a trade off between optimal access regulation in a static framework and in a dynamic one. If static regulation reduces the use of monopoly power over the infrastructure, then it also reduces profits that can be earned by the investor/owner of the facility. Access regulation based on simple cost recovery rules, while encouraging efficient utilisation of assets, may risk discouraging investments. The reason is simple. If operators rationally anticipate that, once somebody has invested, then the regulator will grant access at cost, everybody will then wait for the investment to be done by somebody else and then seek access. This is a typical free rider problem that may cause big losses in social welfare. At best, investments are reduced; in the limit there may even be no production at all if no one invests in infrastructure. If this happens, it is easy to argue that there should be no access regulation since reduced competition is better that no services being supplied. This is clearly an extreme statement, but it should be taken seriously. In the presence of sunk costs, regulation of access terms and prices affects the return an infrastructure owner can expect to receive as a result of its investment efforts. In economic terms, the nature of ex post access regulation has an impact on ex ante incentives to invest. Notice that, in the presence of sunk costs, the hold up problem is not just typical of regulatory appropriation, but may emerge in a similar fashion in an environment with commercial negotiations and contractual incompleteness.
In the presence of infrastructure competition and bottlenecks the regulator's problem becomes particularly challenging and involves many trade-offs. One is the desire to have a downstream level playing field while ensuring the incumbent to recover its upstream fixed costs or some social obligations. The regulator may also want to promote particular entry modes, where the typical dilemma is between facility-based and service-based competition. In telecommunications for instance, in the first case both the incumbent and the entrant build their own backbones and local loop facilities, so it may involve unnecessary duplication of infrastructure. This does not happen in the second case where the entrant leases the incumbent's access facilities; however the environment becomes much more intrusive, while in the first case the regulator can rely more on direct competition than on regulatory intervention. Since suitably adjusted access charges can encourage one particular entry mode, it is clear that investments will respond to access regulation by flowing at different network levels. 13 In addition, the regulator should be concerned about the timing and choice of investments. This issue is particularly important in industries with high technological progress. Since very little is know about this latter class of normative questions, it is helpful first to address the case of what would happen without any regulation at all. Infrastructure owners may want to maximise the use of their facility since its intensive use would reduce the average cost to all users. However, this desire clashes with another one, since the infrastructure owner would also try to reduce downstream competition, which implies a reduction of access to the infrastructure by its rivals.
Imagine a situation where a network has to be built and the investment cost declines over time due to technological progress. An incumbent operator first decides whether and when to invest. Then a rival chooses whether and when to seek access. Finally, if access is sought, the two parties bargain over the terms of access. As is standard in economics, this game has to be solved backwards. In other words, the investment choice is contingent on the expectations about the rival seeking access and on the outcome of negotiations. Imagine also that products are sufficiently differentiated so that the use of the investment is non-rival and infrastructure 13 Cave and Prosperetti in this issue show the existence of a "service bias" in European telecommunications regulation, aimed mainly at opening incumbents' existing infrastructures. In particular, see their section 3.1 owners do not fear the rent dissipation caused by downstream competition and have an incentive to optimise the use of the facility.
In the last stage of the game, negotiations can only be over variables that can be altered at the time of negotiation. As the investment has already taken place, infrastructures themselves are sunk and cannot play a role during negotiations. This typically weakens the provider position. By denying the rival the use of the infrastructure, it gains nothing and loses whatever access charge it might receive. There is also another aspect that crucially affects the scenario.
The access seeker can in fact become the provider itself and sell access to the rival. In this case negotiations would be reversed. There is a potential for both firms to "race" in order to be the first to provide the infrastructure. By doing so, an operator avoids the access payments and receives access revenues. This gives a reason to pre-empt rivals and incentives to invest are then raised. The race to become the "common carrier" speeds up the operators' choices.
However it is not clear if timing choices are aligned with the social optimum. The racing process may go too far and investments happen too soon. 14 Access issues become of greater concern when firms that use the infrastructure are also direct competitors of the infrastructure owner. If competition effects are extreme, the infrastructure owner will not grant access unless required to. Here regulation plays a crucial role. The entrant is obviously keen on obtaining access. Without compensation, however, the incumbent will wish to delay investments. This can be solved by requiring the entrant to bear more of the costs. But for the regulator this increase might reduce the possibility of entry itself. The regulator should try to manage this tension between investment incentives and timely competition. An access price régime can be used by the regulator to create competition between industry participants over the provision of facilities. If a firm "wins" in the provision of infrastructure, it becomes the common provider and receives access payments from other firms. If it loses, it will either pay for access or duplicate the infrastructure. By committing to an appropriate access rule, the regulator can directly determine the difference between winning and losing for operators.
The existing theoretical literature has not come up yet with a general answer to this intricate problem. The possible trade off between static and dynamic efficiency that we where it is argued that such system had a negative impact on investments in access networks, and section 4.2 on Local Loop Unbundling.
14 Gans (2001) shows how, in the simple context of a race between alternative suppliers of very differentiated (non substitute) goods, a simple rule that apportions capital costs according to the relative economic profit that is expected to accrue to the access provider and to the access seeker would allow them to achieve optimal investment choices.
highlighted at the beginning of this section should not be taken as the only possibility since regulation interacts with other important variables such as market structure and entry conditions, competitive behaviour of market participants, and technological progress. For instance, the unintended outcome of bad regulation could be to achieve low levels of both static and dynamic efficiency. This could be the situation in mobile telephony if too little spectrum is made available to a handful of companies that do not compete against each other and do not need to adopt innovative technologies if they are protected against entry by licence conditions. Conversely, under some circumstance it is possible to achieve the best of the possible worlds, i.e., high levels of both static and dynamic efficiency. In this situation operators would be competing against each other, achieving relatively efficient allocations, while still securing profits that create the incentive to invest. The presence of strong network externalities can support a case like this one.
Demand-side effects
The previous section considered the issue of pricing access to bottlenecks. Networks want access to each others' customers because of positive externalities -the fact that consumers'
valuations of a network's service or product increase with the total consumption of the service or product. For example, the value from joining a mobile telephone network is higher when that network has a greater number of roaming agreements with other networks. In the first part of this section, we look more generally at the effect that positive externalities have on the market structure -the number of firms and the degree of competition -of network industries.
We start by supposing that networks are incompatible: the positive externalities arising from a network depend only on that network's size. We argue that expectations play a crucial role in these industries. Many different market structures are possible, depending on expectations; some of these market structures are concentrated, involving a small number of firms and a low degree of competition.
The discussion then moves on to consider compatibility and interconnection between networks. What incentives do networks have to be compatible or to interconnect? This question is crucial for many networks, and particularly at the moment for the Internet. The
Internet is all about connectivity: any two computers anywhere in the world can, in principle, communicate with each other. This can occur only through thousands of interconnection agreements between the many separately-owned communication networks that comprise the Internet. The functioning of the Internet therefore depends on connectivity arrangements.
In the last part of the section, we reverse matters and look at how networks should price when externalities are negative i.e., congestion is present. This is a question of great relevance at the moment for the Internet. Increasing use of the Internet for more and more demanding applications has lead to considerable congestion at certain parts of networks. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) are very much interested in pricing schemes that can offer Internet users the correct incentives so that congestion is reduced and revenues are generated to fund increases in network capacity.
Market structure and oligopoly pricing with positive externalities
You might have experienced a problem when speaking into a microphone when close to a speaker. A small noise going into the microphone is amplified and fed through the speaker, back into the microphone, increased further out through the speaker, and so on; the result is a very loud, unpleasant noise (unless you are Jimi Hendrix). This is an example of positive feedback -a small initial input amplified into a large final output. An analogous effect can occur in markets with positive externalities. When two incompatible networks are of similar size, consumers will have a slight preference (all other things being equal) to join the larger network. But then this network becomes even larger than the other network, and consumers are even more willing to join that network; and so on. An initial small difference between the networks is amplified into a large final difference.
The positive feedback mechanism has several implications. The first is that there are many possible market outcomes. If network A starts off with a small lead in market share over network B, the positive feedback amplifies that difference and A becomes dominant. On the other hand, if network B has the initial advantage, then B becomes dominant. This is a typical co-ordination game. Table 2 shows stylized payoffs for this type of game between two players who each must choose one of two actions: driving on the left-or right-hand side of the road, say. If both choose the same side, then all is well and they both receive a high payoff of 1. If they choose different sides, then a crash results and they both receive a low payoff of -1.
There are two (Nash) equilibria of this game. If player 1 chooses 'left', the player 2's best choice is also 'left'; and vice versa. Hence one equilibrium outcome is for both to choose 'left'. But clearly the same applies to 'right', and this too is an equilibrium of the game.
Player 2
LEFT RIGHT
The discussion so far has assumed that networks are incompatible or not interconnected. This simple story ignores competitive effects between the networks; this can either encourage or discourage compatibility, depending on the situation. In general, interconnection decreases competition between equally-sized networks. To see why, suppose that two networks offer horizontally differentiated products and compete in price; that they start by charging the same price; and that one of the networks considers cutting its price. When the networks do not interconnect, the price cut has two rounds of effect, as above. When the networks interconnect, the first round effect is unaltered: customers are attracted to the network that lowers its price. But the second round effect disappears: a network that is larger is no more attractive than a smaller network, since a consumer joining one network gets the full benefits of all consumers on all networks, due to interconnection. Hence the price elasticity of a network's demand is lower when networks are interconnected, and price competition is less intense. (See Farrell and Saloner (1992) for an analysis of compatibility and price competition with network effects, Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989) and Einhorn (1992) without network effects, and Katz and Shapiro (1985) with quantity competition.) The general conclusion, then, is that equally-sized networks will wish to make their products compatible.
When networks are asymmetric, different conclusions emerge. Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that larger firms tend to be against compatibility, while smaller firms tend to be in favour of compatibility. The reason for this is that, in their model, full compatibility makes all firms symmetric in equilibrium: since the network benefit is the same regardless of which firm a customer buys from, there is no force to make firms different. With incompatibility, however, if one firm is expected to be larger than another (for whatever reason), then these expectations are borne out in equilibrium. The larger firm makes higher profit in the asymmetric equilibrium than in the symmetric case, and so opposes compatibility. See also Mason (1999) for a model in which interconnection may decrease networks' profits, and for a survey of incentives towards compatibility and interconnection.
The asymmetric situation describes better past and current interconnection situations.
Standards wars -fights to establish which of several incompatible technologies will dominate -are common enough. Shapiro and Varian (1999) discuss many interesting historical examples: railroad gauges in the U.S. in the early nineteenth century; international postal systems; and the early days of the telephone. A modern-day example of an interconnection war is instant messaging (IM), a technology that allows computer users to detect when their friends are on-line and to type out real-time messages to them. The market leader for IM is America Online (AOL), whose AIM service has 21.5 million customers, compared to the 10.6 million customers of the next most popular service, Yahoo! Messenger (see http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,s2084246,00.html.) The tremendous success of IM (which is offered free to customers, but generates plentiful advertising revenues) encouraged Microsoft, Yahoo! and several other companies to launch their own IM clients, based on the protocol used by AIM and hence capable of interconnecting with the AIM service. AOL altered its protocol to lock them out, and repeated this action when Microsoft found a way past the block. AOL has declared that it will continue to take active measures to block other firms from interconnecting to its IM service.
A second example of current interconnection disputes is occurring in the Internet. In the early years of the Internet, networks operated a 'bill-and-keep' or peering system, in which no settlement payments were made. (See Srinagesh (1997) for a discussion of interconnection arrangements between packet-based networks making up the Internet.) Each network carried others' traffic without charge -the underlying assumptions being that either flows were roughly symmetric, or any other arrangement would stunt the growth of the Internet. The transition of the Internet from academic to commercial, large increases in traffic volumes, and the unequal development of networks have put this system under considerable stress.
In 1996, the extensive peering arrangements agreed under the Commercial Internet Exchange (CIX) started to dissolve. Large networks argued that they received little benefit, yet incurred substantial costs, from interconnection with small networks; this contrasted with the net benefits gained by the smaller networks from access to the customer base of the larger networks. Large networks began to apply pressure on smaller networks to change the relationship from peers to supplier-customer; instead of bill-and-keep, small networks would make settlement payments to larger networks. In 1997, UUNet, a large ISP, informed 15
smaller ISPs that their peering arrangements would be cancelled; this was followed by UUNet's withdrawal from the CIX. At the same time, MCI and BBN, two other large ISPs, left the CIX agreement, meaning that three out the four largest networks in the U.S. were no longer part of the CIX. 16 The larger networks continue to interconnect between themselves on a peering basis. The gulf between large and small networks has widened progressively with the consolidation taking place in the ISP industry. By November 1997, it was estimated that the U.S.'s four largest networks (UUNet, MCI, BBN and Sprint) accounted for between 85 and 95 per cent of 16 UUNet have responded to criticism about their policy by publishing guidelines stating when UUNet is prepared to interconnect with a smaller network; the guidelines are reported in OECD (1998). UUNet reserves total backbone (i.e., core) Internet traffic, with the remaining volume carried by upwards of 40 other, small networks; see OECD (1998) . There is a growing fear in the industry that large networks will use their size to limit competition in the ISP market by excluding smaller networks from interconnection agreements. See Crémer et al. (2000), who advised GTE on the Internet aspects of the WorldCom/MCI merger, and Cave and Mason (2001) .
This issue continues to be of central important to policy-makers. Most policy positions are based on a suspicion that large networks have market power; and they exercise this market power through interconnection agreements with smaller. Despite considerable research on interconnection, there is no consensus among theorists, and much remains to be done before interconnection and foreclosure is understood.
In addition, more research needs to be done on the effect of positive externalities on market structure. The current result is (roughly speaking) that expectations determine equilibrium; and there are many equilibria that are consistent with various expectations. These facts are common to many economic settings with positive externalities, or complementarities. For example, in Matsuyama (1991) , workers' productivity in the manufacturing sector of a two-sector model is higher, the greater the number of workers employed in the manufacturing sector. In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), investors must decide whether to withdraw or roll-over a deposit to a bank; the payoff from withdrawal (rollingover) is increasing in the number of other investors who withdraw (roll-over). In all of the models, there can be multiple equilibria: if all agents expect one outcome (all to work in the manufacturing sector, join a network or roll-over), then it is optimal for each agent to act in the same way; if all expect another outcome (all to work in agriculture, not join a network or withdraw), then it is optimal for each agent to act in that way.
There has been much interest recently in ensuring uniqueness of equilibrium in these settings. Carlsson and van Damme (1993) argue that in global games (in which the actual payoffs to the game in table 2 are observed by the players with some noise), iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies selects a unique equilibrium (the risk dominant equilibrium). 17
A potentially fruitful area for future research is to use the global game approach to get sharper predictions of market structure in communication industries. This is more than an the right, however, to refuse interconnection with another network, even if that network meets the criteria laid down in the guidelines. 17 Backward induction causes equilibria that are based solely on expectations to be strictly dominated by a unique equilibrium in which agents' strategies are a function of their signals of the payoffs. The key to the argument is that the support of any agent's higher order beliefs about other agents' signals becomes arbitrarily large for a sufficiently high order of beliefs. This idea has been applied in a series of papers by Morris and Shin; see Morris and Shin (2001) for a survey.
immediate application of the Carlsson-van Damme, Morris-Shin analysis, since in those models, all agents are strategically small. An exception to this is Corsetti et al. (2000) , in which there is one 'large' trader. In this model, however, the large agent's action is not observed by the small agents when they choose their action. In the network context, however, consumers do observe a network's price or output before buying. The price or quantity announcement is a public signal made by a strategic agent. Consumers use this public signal, combined with their own private signals, to form beliefs about the true state of the world (the payoff from buying the network's product, say). These beliefs are the equivalent of expectations in earlier models; but this richer setting allows expectation formation to be modelled more explicitly. Further research is needed to know whether concentrated market structures (that are supported by arbitrary expectations in earlier models) can occur in equilibrium in this case.
Pricing with negative externalities: congestion pricing and capacity expansion
By any measure, the growth in communications has been phenomenal. This section starts by examining the economic principles for socially optimal pricing of a congestible resource. It continues by looking at congestion pricing in imperfectly competitive industries. It concludes by reviewing areas for future research.
Socially optimal pricing
Congestion is an example of a negative externality, where there is a gap between private and social valuations of use of the resource. An economist's first response, since Pigou (1920) , is to implement a usage price to close this gap. There are two objectives, however, for the price to achieve. First, it should ensure the efficient level of resource usage. Secondly, it should provide the correct incentives for efficient investment in the capacity of the resource.
In principle, these two objectives are separate and may be contradictory. It is a central result of congestion pricing that under certain conditions, the two objectives are the same: the optimal congestion prices for a fixed amount of capacity automatically generate the appropriate amount of revenue to finance capacity expansion. The optimal usage price equals the total marginal cost (i.e., the sum of marginal costs) that a unit increase in usage imposes on all users. This price internalizes the congestion externality by making each user face the full costs that it imposes on all users. This price equals the marginal value of a unit of capacity; and so capacity should be expanded if and only if the revenue from congestion pricing exceeds the value of expansion.
Mackie- Mason and Varian (1995) give a nice exposition of this result. It is somewhat (but not very) technical, so here we present a numerical example of the pricing principle. N people (where N is very large) wish to use a resource e.g., the Internet to download a music file. All users have the same preferences. If the download takes D minutes and if they have to pay a charge P for using the Internet, each user's utility U is given by: U = 100 -D -P. They receive zero utility from not using the resource. Because of congestion, if M users are simultaneously downloading the file, the time for each download is D = M/K, where K is the capacity of the resource. Suppose that resource use is not priced, so that P = 0. In this case, the number of users N 0 who download is given by the zero utility condition 100 -N 0 /K = 0 i.e., N 0 = 100K. If fewer than 100K people download, then the utility from downloading is positive and more people will want to download. If more than 100K people download, then the utility from downloading is negative and fewer people will want to download. Contrast this to the socially optimal use level, N S , which is the number of downloaders that maximizes the total utility M(100 -M/K) from downloading. A straightforward calculation shows that N S = 50K; the total utility from socially optimal resource use is 2,500K. The negative externality of congestion therefore results in excessive use of the resource: N 0 > N S , as expected.
To achieve the socially optimal use level, a social planner could charge for downloading.
The price P S that equates private and social usage is given by 100 -N S /K -P S = 0, or P S = 50.
This price generates a revenue of 2,500K -that is, the revenue from the socially optimal congestion price equals the total welfare from using the resource in the socially optimal way.
This means that the revenue from the congestion price gives exactly the right signal for capacity expansion (investing in increasing K). Capacity should be increased if and only if the marginal revenue of 2,500 exceeds the marginal cost.
Market structure and oligopoly pricing with negative externalities
This establishes the economic principles behind socially optimal congestion pricing. We are also interested, however, in congestion pricing in imperfectly competitive situations. In fact, the previous discussion of positive externalities is easily adapted to this case. Recall that the 
Universal Service Obligations
Regulators have long been aware of the social aspects of communication, and have been intimately involved with the various services -telecommunications, post, broadcasting etc. -since their beginnings. Due to the widespread use of these services, there are many social dimensions for regulators to cover. Initial 'public interest' arguments meant that virtually all aspects could be regulated. For example, the 1927 Radio Act in the U.S. gave federal regulators the power to issue a license to a broadcaster if they found that it was in the "public interest, convenience or necessity". The absence of any clear definition of 'public interest' means that the FCC could determine the number and identity of broadcasters, the terms and conditions of their operation, and even the content that they broadcast.
The broader social aspects of communications regulation, as well as the competition issues that we have discussing so far in this paper, can be seen in the current 'broadband debate'. Higher bandwidth services, such as high-speed Internet service, video on demand and interactive electronic commerce, have been deemed by many governments to be of fundamental importance to the development of their economy; see e.g., Oftel (1999) . A particular concern is the provision of these services to residential customers (and also small businesses). This has highlighted the lack of competition in local telecommunications markets. In the U.K., broadband services are likely, in the medium-term, to be provided using enhancements (Digital Subscriber Line, DSL) to the fixed copper loop telephone network; this sector is dominated by the incumbent British Telecom, which supplies over 85% of access lines. In the U.S., local access is provided by both cable and local telephone companies; the issue there is what carriage requirements to impose on entrants to the local access market.
Finally, the content that can be delivered over high bandwidth access lines has lead to regulatory initiatives such as the European Union's Action Plan on Promoting Safer Use of the Internet, adopted on January 25th, 1999.
We will not attempt to cover all aspects of regulation in this section. Instead, we will focus on the second of the two objectives stated by most telecoms regulators. For instance, the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to "promote competition and preserve and advance universal service". We have discussed at some length already some aspects of the promotion of competition; see section 2, for example. We will spend the rest of this section discussing the latter objective of universal service.
There are several reasons given for imposing universal service obligations (USOs the FCC has listed a set of services and quality levels that are included in universal service (e.g., voice-grade access to the public switched network, touch-tone, etc.), and detailed maximum prices that can be charged for specific services, and on average across all services.
This exercise is, of course, problematic. Technological progress means that the set of basic services is constantly expanding, and minimum quality levels are ambiguous (for example, wireless services allow greater mobility, but typically have lower sound quality and completion rates).
In the past, incumbent telecom operators were responsible for USOs; indeed, in the U.K., this is still the case (as mentioned in the introduction). In the U.S., USO obligations are not restricted to incumbents and universal service subsidies are paid to any company that accepts a commitment to service all consumers in its area. The subsidies are paid for typically by cross-subsidization: the income from more profitable markets (such as long-distance or business customers) is used to cover losses incurred by charging low prices to low-income or high-cost consumers. The alternative of financing universal service subsidies through general taxation is not generally used in telecommunications, although it is used in other cases; for example, in the U.K., subsidies to winners of railroad franchises are covered from general taxes. This is despite the fact that financing from general taxation would be a cheaper (i.e., less distortionary) way to raise the required revenue, at least in developed countries.
USOs are under increasing pressure. The first source of pressure appears to be political, but actually has solid economics to back it up. A major problem with USOs is that they are blunt. A USO to cover high-cost rural areas at the same price as low-cost urban areas benefits high income rural consumers at the expense of low income urban consumers. More precisely, it may be inefficient to effect a particular objective -higher welfare for rural residentsthrough distorting the prices of particular services. This point has been made formally by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) , who show that, under certain circumstances, the best way to redistribute income is through the taxation of income, not consumption.
In the Atkinson-Stiglitz model, consumers differ in their income levels (actually, in their ability levels, which affect income). Hence their result speaks most directly to the issue of subsidies to low-income consumers. It is straightforward, however, to re-interpret their model in terms of low-and high-cost consumers. One of the key conditions required for this result is that low and high income consumers have the same relative preferences for consumption goods (i.e., the marginal rate of substitution between consumption goods is independent of income). In this case, taxing consumption -effectively what occurs when the prices of telecommunications services are altered -in order to fund universal service is unnecessarily inefficient. The better way to redistribute income (which, after all, is what a universal service subsidy does) is to tax income. To encourage people to live in high-cost rural areas, the theorem suggests that a location-specific income tax break is better than offering a telecommunications subsidy.
Changes in the assumptions underlying the Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem will, of course, change the result. For example, it may be that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption goods is not independent of income. Then it may be worth taxing those goods that the rich have a relative preference for and subsidizing the goods preferred (relatively) by the poor. Nevertheless, the result is important for emphasizing that USOs must be assessed carefully for their validity and not simply accepted.
The second challenge facing USOs comes from the introduction of competition.
Telecommunications markets in many countries have been opened up to competition. In the U.S., the break-up of AT&T in 1984 allowed competition in previously monopolized markets.
In the U.K., the first competitor to the previously-nationalized BT was licensed in 1982; in 1991, the market was opened further. In both cases, the idea was to use competitive forces to assist in the regulation of dominant operators. But this has consequences for the financing of USOs. USOs are supported by cross-subsidization. This cross-subsidization is sustainable while a single firm operates across the various markets. But when a second firm is able to operate, it will choose to enter the more profitable market-a process known as creamskimming. This has three implications. First, the distortions in prices that the USO requires can lead to inefficient entry. Secondly, the subsidy required to support the USO is higher than it is when entry cannot occur; since financing the USO is distortionary, this means that the social cost of the USO is higher. Finally, USOs that come in the form of a uniform pricing requirement can have strategic effects that need to be recognised by regulators.
The first point is most clearly seen in a single market case. (The following example is taken from Armstrong (2001b) .) Suppose that there is a single group of consumers with inelastic unit demand for telecommunications service. The incumbent can provide this service at cost C per consumer, giving each consumer gross utility U. The price that the incumbent charges is mandated to be P per consumer; if the consumers belong to a high-cost market, then typically P < C. An entrant can provide the same service at cost c, giving gross utility of u; it charges a price p, where p is not restricted (since the USO is imposed only on the incumbent). Social welfare is the sum of consumer surplus plus profit; so welfare when the incumbent serves the market is (U -P) + (P -C) = U -C, and when the entrant serves the market, it is u -c. Hence entry is socially desirable if and only if u -c ≥ U -C i.e., C ≥ c + U -u. Given the incumbent's price, the entrant can attract consumers if its price satisfies u -p ≥ U -P; that is, if P -U + u ≥ p. Entry will occur whenever the maximum price that the entrant can charge covers its cost, that is when P -U + u ≥ c, or P ≥ c + U -u. Comparing this with the socially optimal condition for entry, we see that whenever P does not equal C (which is typically the case when USOs are involved), entry occurs inefficiently. When P > c + U -u > C, entry occurs when it is socially undesirable. When P < c + U -u < C, entry does not occur, even though it is socially desirable. This story can be extended to incorporate access pricing.
The general moral that emerges is that when there are retail distortions due to a USO, a retail instrument should be used in combination with an appropriate access charge. Use of the access charge alone both to provide the right entry incentives and to correct the retail distortion is inferior.
When consumers are heterogeneous, with some being high-cost and others low-cost, a USO subsidy set without regard to competition will be too low. The reason is obvious: such a subsidy assumes that the operator can earn excess profits from low-cost consumers, that can be used to finance service to high-cost consumers. Competition eliminates these profits, and so increases the required subsidy. There are further effects of competition, however, studied by Choné et al. (2000) and Valletti et al. (2001) . These authors show that a USO affects the way in which operators compete. In particular, a uniform pricing restriction creates linkages between markets. Depending on the nature of competition (along the lines identified in Bulow et al., 1985) , this may make operators less aggressive in those markets, leading to higher equilibrium prices and deadweight loss.
The tension between universal service and competition represents a considerable challenge for regulators. A promising line of research to resolve this tension is the use of universal service auctions, in which operators bid for a level of subsidy (competition for the market), with the market structure after the auction determined by the bids in the auction (competition in the market).
Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the implications of the four defining characteristics of networks: their cost structure; the strong complementarity between their components; the demand-side externalities that arise from consumption of their services; and the social obligations attached to them. Communication networks have, from their inception, been subject to close regulatory attention, due to these characteristics. Despite all of this attention, many aspects of competition between networks are still poorly understood. Add to this the rapid change in communications arising from technological progress, and you have an area that will continue to trouble regulators and interest academics for some time to come.
